PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.12
5 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DE RIVERO (Peru)

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General debate (continued)

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (continued)

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GE.90-66081/2342B

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that, for future generations to live in peace, it was essential to ensure strict application of the NPT, a treaty that was of vital importance to the whole world, since it was aimed at directing into beneficial channels the extraordinary power of nuclear energy and at preserving international peace, security and stability. It divided States Parties into two categories: those which possessed nuclear weapons and those which did not, each category having its own important obligations to discharge.

Luxembourg was a small non-nuclear-weapon country but was very attached to the observance of its obligations regarding non-proliferation and it had adhered to the international control régimes on the export of nuclear materials; it applied the directives of the London Club and was a member of the Zangger Committee on the export of nuclear materials and equipment. It also abided by the international control régime on the export of missiles and had ratified the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. His country fully complied with the safeguards régime set up in implementation of article III of the NPT, in conformity with an agreement entered into in 1974. It had enacted domestic legislation enabling it to comply with its non-proliferation obligations relating to the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and the conditions for their physical protection.

It was disturbing that some States continued to remain outside the non-proliferation régime and that some States situated in sensitive regions might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. His delegation invited countries which were not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it and also called on all States Parties which had not yet concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA to do so.

Admittedly, progress had been achieved on disarmament in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but none had been made in multilateral disarmament negotiations. However, the existence of three nuclear-weapon-free zones, in Latin America, in the South Pacific and in Antarctica, was a matter for satisfaction.

Luxembourg was more and more persuaded that nuclear weapon tests did not enhance world security. In fact, those tests could lead to the development of new nuclear weapons and could favour both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A comprehensive test ban treaty, allied to an effective

control régime, could make a significant contribution to the objectives of non-proliferation and act as an important step towards nuclear disarmament. His country hoped that multilateral negotiations in that direction would be initiated without delay. Lastly, he wished to stress that the main objective of the present Conference should be to demonstrate to the world the important role of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, fostering disarmament.

Mr. MARKIDES (Cyprus) expressed his delegation's wishes for the successful completion of the Conference for the benefit not only of the Contracting Parties to the NPT but of the world at large. The twenty-second anniversary of the opening of the NPT for signature and the fact that 45 years had elapsed since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a reminder for the whole world of the horror and destruction of nuclear war. At a time when the improvement in East-West relations created a climate that favoured confidence, co-operation and democracy, the present Conference should provide an opportunity for all States to review the operation of the NPT frankly and objectively and to try and identify its successes and weaknesses in order to achieve broader acceptance of it. Recent political developments underlined the importance of strict and faithful implementation of the NPT and strengthened the belief that international peace and security would be achieved basically by political means through international co-operation and peaceful negotiations based on the principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the observance of human rights.

As already pointed out during the debate, the NPT was important mainly as an arms control agreement. As such, it was indeed a historical achievement. From a realistic standpoint, however, the Treaty would be regarded as a contract or as a bargain between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The former had promised to end their vertical proliferation in exchange for a binding commitment by the latter States to end horizontal proliferation. Actually, the question whether the NPT had indeed effectively contributed to horizontal non-proliferation was a matter of appraisal, since there was no truly reliable denial of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, his delegation had the impression that matters would have been very different if it had not been for the NPT. By its very existence, the NPT appeared to have overcome the fulfilment of prophecies in the past to the effect that the number of nuclear-weapon States would have increased to 20 or 25 by now. On the other hand, with regard to vertical

proliferation, the nuclear-weapon States had been constantly enriching their arsenals qualitatively and quantitatively. At the same time, more sophisticated and much more accurate systems of delivery heralded greater destructive capacity.

In addition to its non-proliferation provisions, the NPT embodied an obligation on the part of the States Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Full compliance with those provisions remained to be proved.

Despite the conclusion of a number of arms control treaties, including some important bilateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, there had, unfortunately, been no significant and substantial progress towards the aims set out in article VI of the NPT. In that connection, he joined with other speakers who had welcomed the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe - the INF Treaty. That agreement was a first small, but positive, step towards achieving some of the objectives of the NPT. It was to be hoped that the recent favourable developments in international relations would make it possible for an agreement to be reached preventing an arms race in space and ending it on Earth. Such an agreement was essential not only as a necessary balancing element for the self-restraint shown by the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties under article II of the NPT but also as an encouragement to other States, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, to join the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty.

Promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, another important element of the NPT, would greatly contribute to the wellbeing of humanity. Important practical benefits from the use of nuclear energy had already been obtained in many fields, including power, medicine, industry and agriculture. Safeguards were, of course, necessary to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy into non-peaceful uses. It was also essential to bear in mind the devastating effects that accidents in nuclear installations could have on the environment for generations to come. The international system of safeguards was therefore of the utmost importance and was inseparably tied in with the NPT provisions on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connection, he wished to praise the work being done by the IAEA in

administering the safeguards system in such a responsible and efficient manner. Any progress in improving the safeguards system would be a substantial contribution towards realization of the goals of the NPT.

As recognized in the preamble to the NPT, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty was essential in order to achieve nuclear disarmament. Negotiations in that direction should be resumed as soon as possible and such a treaty could perhaps be completed within a few years. The process could be hastened by a linkage between the comprehensive test ban and the NPT. The declaration adopted in September 1989 by the Non-Aligned Summit Conference stated, inter alia, that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was absolutely essential for the preservation of the non-proliferation régime embodied in the NPT. His delegation was in full agreement with the proposals put forward by other non-aligned countries with a view to preserving and strengthening the NPT. Those proposals included: (1) the declaration of a moratorium on all nuclear tests explosions till 1995; (2) a moratorium on the production of fissionable material; (3) the promotion of full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Ad hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament; (4) a readiness to accept multilaterally binding legal instruments to guarantee all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (5) support and recognition for existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and for those to be established in the future; (6) improved IAEA assistance to developing countries through financing institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

When the world's nuclear weapons arsenal was more than enough to destroy mankind, billions were being spent by the nuclear-weapon States on the development of destructive weapons. It was high time for those States to divert those huge sums to purposes beneficial to humanity, a great part of which was living under conditions of absolute deprivation.

Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal) extended a warm welcome to the observer delegations of France and China, which were participating in a Review Conference of the NPT for the first time.

The East-West process of détente and positive developments in some regional conflicts in the past few years had justified expectations that the present Conference would take place in a favourable international atmosphere.

That atmosphere, however, had been radically altered by the crisis provoked in the Gulf by the annexation of Kuwait, which had been clearly condemned in all international forums.

In view of its aims, its membership, and the effects produced since it had entered into force, the NPT could be considered as a cornerstone of international security. Only two months previously, in Dublin, the leaders of the member countries of the European Community had expressed their concern about nuclear weapons proliferation and had solemnly urged those States which were not yet parties to accede to the NPT. His delegation wished now to echo that appeal. Accession by all countries, especially those with a known nuclear weapons capability, was essential to the credibility of the NPT. Equally indispensable for sound application and effectiveness of the NPT was strict compliance with its terms. It was regrettable that a number of States Parties continued to oppose proper implementation of the IAEA safeguard mechanisms, whose role was of paramount importance in the implementation of the Treaty.

Another major problem lay in the non-compliance with article I, which prohibited the transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear explosive devices and assistance and encouragement given in any way to such States in order to enable them to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. There had been examples of neglect which had ended in the clandestine transfer to such States of technology and/or fissile material falling under the provisions of article I of the NPT. His delegation did not, of course, deny the inalienable right of every country to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and it was well aware of the pressing needs of developing countries wishing to benefit from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, strict respect by the States Parties for the safeguards system was naturally interlinked with proper implementation of transfers of know-how and materials.

Since the Third Review Conference, there had been many welcome and sometimes unexpected political and military events of great significance for world security and peace. In that connection, great credit must go to the United States and the Soviet Union for their successful efforts in reducing the risks of nuclear confrontation - the INF Treaty and the verification protocols of the Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the promising prospect of the signing of a strategic arms reduction treaty. Those developments had paved the way for important multilateral and

bilateral moves aimed at further reducing both conventional and nuclear arsenals not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. Moreover, the proposals made by the NATO countries for creating a joint NATO/Warsaw Pact declaration open to all countries members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) had contributed to a more relaxed political atmosphere in Europe.

Under the terms of article X, the Conference had to decide in 1995 on the question of extending the NPT. Portugal was unequivocally in favour of extending it indefinitely beyond 1995. Lastly, it was his hope that the Conference would produce a final document reflecting in a realistic and balanced manner the dramatic progress made during the past few years, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. Such were the sincerest wishes of his country, which was proud of scrupulously complying with its obligations under the Treaty.

Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the importance of the Review Conference lay in the variety of issues under consideration in assessing progress achieved in the field of non-proliferation and indeed in the fundamental goal of the Treaty - to remove the threat of nuclear warfare for the whole human race. Again, the Conference was all the more important in that it was taking place at a time of détente among the major nuclear Powers and the strengthening of international relations. Great changes had taken place in the international order, thereby vesting détente with strategic depth and furthering it without it being reported to the purely political and tactical contingencies.

Despite the fact that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not lived up to all aspirations, it had nevertheless succeeded in securing some progress. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were not moving towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons and all acted in full conformity with article II of the Treaty. However, the Treaty had weaknesses as well as strengths. It had not managed to broaden the scope of prohibition to prevent more States from having access to nuclear weapons, and it had not prevailed upon non-party States to accede to the Treaty. It was also regrettable that nuclear-weapon States Parties had not given preference in their co-operation activities to developing countries that were States Parties. The discriminatory structure of the Treaty remained, with some obligations being incumbent on certain States but not on others. At the same time, constraints imposed on the transfer of technology were a serious threat to the advancement of the

developing countries. Furthermore, the safeguards system had not been entirely respected, for the IAEA had not been in a position to apply the system fully in all cases; to be meaningful any safeguards system must be total.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be made less discriminatory and it should be aimed at ensuring accession by all States in order to achieve universality and to guarantee that there would be no recourse to nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State. In addition, it was to be hoped that the present situation of détente would lead towards an international commitment to put an end to the production of nuclear weapons and to destroy existing nuclear arsenals and indeed all weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological.

A special situation prevailed in the Middle East, which was currently undergoing a temporary crisis which his delegation hoped would be settled through Arab wisdom. For some decades, the region had experienced ongoing tension caused by the State of Israel in its desire for hegemony. Israel had acquired nuclear weapons thanks to the assistance of a few nuclear-weapon States, contrary to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that context, he appealed to the international community, the United Nations and the IAEA to work with the States of the Middle East to create a nuclear-free zone in the area. He urged the international organizations to apply the relevant resolutions in that respect and hoped that Israel would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and apply full-scope safeguards.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) referred to the remarks made by some representatives, including the delegation of the United Kingdom, a depositary State party, and the delegation of Australia in the course of general debate on the issue of the safeguards agreement currently under negotiation between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He also mentioned the statement made by the head of his delegation, in which he had pointed to the prevailing situation peculiar to the Korean peninsula, which directly affected his country's national security, and had made clear that his Government intended as a matter of principle to conclude a safeguards agreement. It was highly regrettable that some speakers had failed to note in their remarks the grave nuclear threat posed by a Depositary State Party to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a small non-nuclear-weapon State.

Obviously, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been elaborated as a result of the need to remove the nuclear threat and to achieve nuclear disarmament. Hence, the fundamental objectives of the Treaty had made the issue of security assurances one of the most important items on the agenda of the present Conference. Intentional failure in regard to one of those two aspects was, clearly, not a pragmatic approach and it would not help the strengthening and extension of the Treaty. He called upon States Parties to render valuable assistance in favour of the early conclusion of an agreement on security assurances between the nuclear threatener and the threatened, with a view to facilitating the conclusion of the safeguards agreement.

Lastly, he referred to the statement made in the general debate by the representative of Australia, in which the latter attempted to tell the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea what to do with its Government. He would remind the delegation of Australia that the Governments of States Parties were fully represented at the Conference. He wished to express his deep regret that such a flippant and imprudent statement against a sovereign State had been made by a foreign minister, a responsible statesman of a country, and drew attention to the possible consequences of such an act, which might affect the very authority of important conferences like the present Review Conference.

The CHAIRMAN, announcing the conclusion of the general debate, observed that 62 speakers had been heard in a positive atmosphere, free of recrimination or substantive departure from the main objectives of the Conference. Many delegations had referred to some significant progress in the implementation of the Treaty, including disarmament and arms limitation measures, the continuation of negotiations on the reduction of strategic short-range nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons, and the fact that during the period under review the number of declared nuclear-weapon States had not increased. At the same time, it had been indicated that some matters, such as nuclear testing and negative security assurances required special attention.

Lastly, the general debate had been balanced and productive and the Conference could go on to the next stage of its work, during which the Committees must concentrate on specific review exercises. Generally speaking, it might be said that delegations to the Conference had shown a readiness to work towards a balanced and positive final document.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11) (continued)

The CHAIRMAN, referring to rule 12 of the rules of procedure, said he would take it that the Conference agreed to the schedule for participation in the costs of the Conference, which would be revised in the light of the real participation and of the costs incurred in the Conference and in the preparatory process.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN said that, as a result of his appeal, the financial problem of the Conference was practically resolved, as a number of pledges had been announced and the Secretary-General of the United Nations was, on that basis, authorizing the continuation of basic services until the Conference completed its work, on 14 September 1990.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.13
17 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 September 1990, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. DE RIVERO (Peru)

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Reports of the Main Committees

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The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.

REPORTS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES (agenda item 15)

Report of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/1)

Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria), Chairman of Main Committee I, introduced its report. Section I recorded the outcome of the review of articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3. A consensus had emerged on most of the text, but those parts on which agreement had not been reached had been placed in square brackets. Section II, regarding article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, showed that the Committee had been unable to agree on any text on that issue. As the report (page 10) made clear, the Chairman's paper was attached as an annex without prejudice to the position of any delegation.

As could be seen in Section III, containing the report of the work by the Sub-Committee on Security Assurances and subsequently by Working Group 2, agreement had been arrived at on all paragraphs but two. Paragraph 6 included a reference to unilateral declarations of all nuclear-weapon States "attached to this Final Declaration", which meant the final declaration of the Conference itself. He requested those States that had not already done so to forward those unilateral statements to the secretariat as soon as possible so that they could be attached to the Conference's final declaration.

Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation, welcoming a suggestion for a useful contribution to the work of the Conference, was pleased to submit its security assurance as an annex to the final document. The security assurance of the United States was long-standing and had been reaffirmed by three successive Administrations.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom) said that her delegation was pleased to see its unilateral security assurance attached to the final document. It had first been formulated in 1978 and since reiterated, and she read it out: "I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State". Needless to say, the non-nuclear-weapon States must also comply with their obligations under article II of the Treaty.

The United Kingdom would continue to consult with the delegation of Nigeria and other delegations with a view to finding a mutually acceptable text for inclusion in the final document.

Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) announced that his Government's text on security assurances was also ready for inclusion in the final document.

The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee I.

It was so decided.

Report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/1)

Mr. STRULAK (Poland), Chairman of Main Committee II, introduced its report. The Committee had made intensive efforts to arrive at a consensus and, despite reservations by a number of delegations, which had been duly reproduced in the report, agreement had been reached on a number of key elements of the Treaty.

In the review of article III, delegations had overwhelmingly reaffirmed the importance of a universal safeguards system as one of the pillars of an effective non-proliferation régime and had commended the IAEA in its role in that area. Significant progress had been made on special inspection missions by the IAEA, more transparency in IAEA safeguards information reports, and safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. There was recognition of the progress made by the Zangger Committee on controlling the export of sensitive items, and the continuation of NPT-inspired activities was encouraged. The Committee also stressed the importance of full-scope safeguards.

In the review of article VII, widespread support had been reaffirmed for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia, and the valuable role of existing zones in Latin America, the South Pacific and Antarctica had been underscored.

In its consideration of article X, which related, inter alia, to extending the Treaty beyond 1995, the Committee had been unable to reach a consensus on a text for inclusion in its report to the Conference, but he felt there was still room to build on the discussions and proposals on that subject. The Committee had decided not to recommend any additional formulations on articles I, II and IX after being informed of the language proposed for those articles by Main Committees I and III.

The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee II.

It was so decided.

Report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/MC.III/2)

Mr. YAMADA (Japan), Chairman of Main Committee III, introduced its report. The Committee had considered the wording of 11 substantive items for the final declaration of the Conference and had agreed upon language for 10 items. Owing to disagreement on item IX, however, it had been unable to adopt the formulations as a whole. Intensive consultations had subsequently been undertaken on item IX, agreement had been reached, and the Drafting Committee had adopted by consensus the whole of the substantive part of the report, with item IX amended. The package formulation was thus intended to form part of the final declaration.

The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

It was so decided.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that, while some progress had been made in elaborating the chapters of the final declaration corresponding to the topics assigned to Main Committees II and III, there continued to be difficulties with regard to the issues in Main Committee I, of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race, and security guarantees. His delegation shared the general desire to see the work of the Conference crowned by the adoption of a meaningful final declaration and not merely a document which tried to conceal certain basic facts regarding matters of fundamental interest to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. He therefore hoped that a final declaration would be adopted by consensus, but by a consensus that itself was meaningful.

The present Conference afforded a unique opportunity to begin in 1991 preparations for the extension conference in 1995 and to work constructively at the Amendment Conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in January 1991. The NPT should be extended well beyond 1995, and it was for that purpose that his delegation was co-sponsoring the draft resolutions contained in documents NPT/CONF.IV/L.3 and L.4.

He wished to reiterate that the success of the Conference depended on whether it would be possible to agree, first, on renewed efforts for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, second, on early steps for the preparation of the 1995 Conference, and third, on the establishment of

a mechanism to work out an instrument on security guarantees. Again, the fate of the NPT depended on the way in which the three Depositaries fulfilled their obligations under article VI. There was a close link between the provisions of the NPT on nuclear disarmament and those on review conferences and the limited duration of the Treaty. That issue was brought out in the working paper circulated by his delegation under the symbol NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.3, also issued as NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.13. Mexico's position in that respect was held by a great many other States.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.14
27 November 1990

PT. Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 14 September 1990, at 6.30 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Report of the Drafting Committee

Closure of the Conference

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

GE.90-66171/2534B

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

(b) REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/CC.1 and Corr.1)

Mr. GROOP (Finland) introduced the report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.IV/CC.1 and Corr.1) on behalf of the members of the Committee. The Committee had held two meetings and, at its second meeting, had examined and accepted the credentials of the representatives of all participating States parties on the understanding that those States that had not yet submitted formal credentials should communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible. He was pleased to say that, since the publication of the report, credentials in due form had been received from Italy and the Philippines.

The PRESIDENT said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the report of the Credentials Committee.

It was so decided.

REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

The PRESIDENT said that the Chairman of the Drafting Committee had just informed him that intensive consultations were still in progress on certain aspects of the Conference's work. He therefore suggested that the meeting should be suspended until the work of the Drafting Committee had concluded.

The meeting was suspended at 6.35 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 a.m. on 15 September

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden), introducing the report of the Drafting Committee (NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1), said that the Committee had considered at length the reports of the Main Committees and the proposals contained in documents NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/Adds.1, 2, 3(A) and Corr.1, 3(B), 3(C) and 3(D). Notwithstanding extensive consultations and considerable effort, the Committee had not been able to reach a consensus on a draft final declaration for consideration by the Conference.

The PRESIDENT said that he had been asked by various delegations to suspend the session for 10 minutes, before opening the floor for discussion, so that they might consult among themselves in the search for consensus.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 a.m. and resumed at 3.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT, noting that a consensus had still not been reached, said that he wished to make a solemn and personal appeal to the Conference to attempt to reach a compromise.

The Conference was taking place in a new international socio-political context, in which a trend towards compromise and tolerance was prevailing. Recent years had seen a de-ideologization of international relations and the emergence of new perceptions. If those new perceptions were not made to converge, all future bilateral and multilateral disarmament conferences would be invested with a feeling of bitterness that did not correspond to the international situation. All the work in the three Main Committees would be lost if one final effort were not made to resolve the disagreements over the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, article VI and article X.

He would therefore make one last effort by providing very brief texts of his own that attempted to indicate the extent of the differences of opinion. In such a way States parties would not be deprived, by political discord, of the practical value of a review that showed the Treaty to be healthy and functioning well in many respects.

The President's suggested texts were as follows:

"Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12

"The Conference deeply regrets that it was unable to arrive at an agreed text in its review of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12.

"Considerable efforts were made, in the course of intensive negotiations, to find agreed positions, assessments and recommendations. In the event, however, consensus was not possible other than to note the President's characterization of the differences, as described below in abbreviated form.

"A view held strongly by a number of States parties included the following elements: despite the obligations imposed in the Treaty, no agreements relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race had so far emerged; no progress had been made on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament; despite the ending of the cold war the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties were undergoing continuing development, including the development and deployment of new delivery systems; the number of strategic warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties have increased threefold since the entry into force of the Treaty; the aim of the START talks, if realized, would leave more strategic nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States than when the negotiations were made in 1982; the continued testing of nuclear weapons

by the nuclear-weapon States parties would put the future of the Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt. According to this view, the undertakings, objectives and aspirations of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty remained unfulfilled.

"A differing view held equally strongly by a number of other States parties included the following elements: there had been significant and positive developments in the international sphere since the 1985 Review Conference, particularly a substantial improvement in relations between the United States and the USSR and a greatly decreased level of tensions in Europe; the entry into force of the INF Treaty on 1 June 1988 had been a major advance in eliminating an entire class of nuclear arms and introducing verification provisions of innovative character and scope; decisive progress in bilateral negotiations on the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which would be a major landmark in arms control; significant bilateral achievements in reducing chemical arms; the prospect for a far-reaching agreement on conventional forces reduction in Europe within a short time. According to this view, the period since 1985 had witnessed important progress towards achieving the undertakings, objectives and aspirations of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty.

"All States parties continued to express their strong support for the continued viability of the Treaty in the future.

"Article X

"The Conference regrets that it was unable to arrive at agreed language regarding the provisions of article X of the Treaty other than to note paragraph 2 of that article which states that:

> "'Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.'"

The PRESIDENT said that he intended to suspend the session for 30 minutes so that his proposals could be considered. On resumption, should his proposed texts not find acceptance, he would withdraw them and proceed to the closing of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 3.45 a.m. and resumed at 4.30 a.m.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that his delegation found itself in an uncomfortable position as it would have preferred to be able to accept the proposed compromise. After intensive negotiations in the Non-Aligned Group, a consensus had been within reach, but had not been possible because of other delegations' positions. Now the President was asking the participants to accept a new text that was very different in both form and content from the one that they had been negotiating. While the President's efforts were appreciated, accepting the text would leave many questions unresolved, including the conclusions relating to article VI. His delegation had made major concessions during the negotiations, as reflected in the texts that had emerged from Main Committees II and III, and it had hoped that others would do so with regard to article VI. Since that had unfortunately not been the case, his delegation must oppose the compromise solution, and he was certain that other delegations shared that view.

The PRESIDENT, recognizing that his proposed texts had not found consensus acceptance, said that no final declaration would emerge from the Conference. He noted that the draft final declaration contained much of benefit to many delegations. He hoped, although he doubted, that the lack of a final declaration would not adversely affect future negotiations on disarmament in the United Nations.

That having been said, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the report of the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.

Mr. REESE (Australia) said that, although all the purposes of the non-proliferation Treaty might not have been fulfilled, it was clear that the world would be a far more insecure place without it. Although much remained to be achieved with respect to nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test ban, those elements should be seen in the context of the full and thorough review of the Treaty that had taken place, in accordance with its terms. As the Australian Foreign Minister had emphasized in his plenary statement, the Treaty was a vital element of the international non-proliferation régime. The dedication of all delegations to the task of the Conference confirmed the instrument's vitality.

Discussion at the Conference had been creative and for the most part constructive in accordance with the new spirit prevailing in the international community. Among the more important achievements of the past four weeks had been: new agreed wording on negative security assurances and security

guarantees; agreement on the need to bring about the discontinuance of nuclear explosions; agreement on an enhanced role for the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear testing; common understanding on future priorities for peaceful nuclear co-operation; concrete proposals for strengthening the barriers against the further spread of nuclear weapons; and perhaps most significantly, consensus on the need for nuclear suppliers to contribute to the goal of non-proliferation by requiring a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation and the application of full-scope safeguards. The overwhelming majority of suppliers had already taken unilateral action to that effect, and he hoped that those which had not done so would take early action in response to the views prevailing at the Conference.

The ideas, proposals and agreements in the reports of Main Committees II and III concerning enhanced security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be retained and utilized. It was vital that everyone should work together in IAEA and other relevant bodies to implement those proposals and thereby strengthen the central role of the Treaty in international security and nuclear trade and co-operation over the next five years.

Referring to the remarks made by the representative of Mexico, he said it was astonishing that negotiations on paragraphs 5 and 7 of the section on article VI had foundered essentially on a simple request to note the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on their bilateral negotiations on testing. His delegation deeply regretted the loss of consensus on a final declaration over that issue.

In conclusion, he said his delegation would make every effort to ensure that the many positive results of the Conference served as a guide in the period until the next milestone for the Treaty, the 1995 review and extension conference.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the Conference had been fruitful and had confirmed the commitment of the States parties to upholding the non-proliferation régime. In place of disappointment at the lack of a final declaration, the prospect of the 1995 Conference should stimulate continued efforts. Japan firmly believed in the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty as a system that made it possible to combine non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) expressed his delegation's appreciation for the constructive way in which the various committees of the Conference had worked. Mexico had attempted to contribute to the elaboration of a final declaration that would strengthen the Treaty and assure its extension past 1995, and sincerely regretted that it had not been possible to arrive at a text that aimed in that direction. Article VIII, paragraph 3 did not stipulate that every five-year exercise must adopt a final declaration. What was important was that the parties should have the opportunity to exchange views on the Treaty's functioning, and that had been accomplished. The Conference had identified areas of satisfaction and areas in which there was a growing lack of agreement, such as the comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and security guarantees for non-nuclear States parties. Another subject of particular importance had been the extension conference to take place in 1995.

As had been repeated throughout the Conference, there was a close link between the limited duration of the non-proliferation Treaty and the provisions of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty. That link remained, with or without a final declaration, and would be of decisive importance in 1995.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) endorsed the statements made by the representatives of Australia and Japan. The Conference had reconfirmed the commitment of the vast majority of States parties to the Treaty and revealed a broad consensus on how to implement and strengthen it. The few issues on which consensus had not been reached related to one part of article VI only, and did not jeopardize the large majority of topics on which agreement existed.

On the positive side of the balance were agreements on the application of full-scope safeguards, the innovative idea of special inspections and the notable agreement on how to approach the problem area of a tax on nuclear facilities. On the less positive side, for the first time the possibility had arisen of the undermining of the Treaty from within. Much attention had been paid to that problem in the review of both article II and the safeguards régime. He regretted that the Mexican delegation had not shown much interest in that threatening phenomenon, being absorbed as it had been by one issue.

Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria) expressed his delegation's deep regret at the lack of a final declaration. Consensus had appeared to be within reach during the exercise that had taken place in the Swedish mission, and in his view some differences could have been resolved if flexibility had been displayed. He hoped that setback would not undermine faith in the Treaty, which remained a corner-stone of international peace and security.

Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) speaking on behalf of the countries of the Eastern European Group, expressed sincere gratitude to the President and the Chairmen of the Main Committees. In the view of his delegation, an important and useful Conference had taken place in a new political context. It had confirmed the great vitality of the Treaty and the attachment of the States parties to it. The lack of a final declaration in no way undermined that conclusion. On a majority of issues wording had been prepared that went further than the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and that material would play a useful role in future efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. Only one matter remained unresolved - that of the comprehensive test ban, on which his delegation's position was well known.

The results of the Conference would serve as a guide for strengthening the effectiveness of the Treaty, and it was everyone's duty to work towards its universality, in order to arrive at the next review conference with a shared view of the need for a long-term extension of the Treaty beyond 1995.

Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation believed the basic task of the Conference had been fully met. A comprehensive and thorough review had been conducted of all aspects of the Treaty, and the significance and interconnection of the aspects of non-proliferation, arms control and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been highlighted throughout the debates.

In contrast to past review conferences, the session had taken place at a time when enormous political, social and economic changes signalled the possibility of a world less burdened by confrontation, hostility and fear. However, the debates had also coincided with a situation in which unprecedented action by the United Nations Security Council had been necessary to address a major regional conflict threatening the interests of all nations. In that hopeful yet still dangerous atmosphere, virtually all participating Governments had pointed to the Treaty as a vital element in preserving global stability and peace.

Another and very important result of the Conference was the commitment by a clear majority of participating States to the importance of extending the life of the Treaty for a considerable period of time. Looking forward to 1995, the views expressed at the Conference provided a very strong basis for maintaining and enhancing the role of the Treaty in the future. It was regrettable that those and other important results had not been embodied in a consensus final declaration. His delegation had worked very hard to find consensus and common ground and, during the process of discussion and debate, a wide measure of agreement had been achieved on many fundamental interests arising from the provisions of the Treaty. Much of the Conference could therefore be termed a success.

In conclusion, he stressed the continuing importance of the Treaty for world peace and security. All must strive to make it universal and defend it against critics, who might fail to appreciate its role in maintaining a world where the role of nuclear weapons was diminished rather than increased.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), speaking on behalf of the Western Group, associated herself with those who had expressed gratitude to the President for his efforts to save the final declaration, in which he had so nearly succeeded. It was a great pity that consensus had not been reached, especially - as the representative of Australia had said - in view of the rather surprising point on which discussion in the Drafting Committee had broken down. However, a great deal of common ground had been identified and common text agreed, and that included agreement on some article VI issues. On balance it must be said that the Conference had confirmed the deep commitment of all to the Treaty and strengthened its effectiveness.

Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that the lack of agreement on a certain part of the text of the draft final declaration, although regrettable, did not diminish the achievements of a very thorough review, reflecting the continuing vitality of the Treaty and the attachment of all the States parties to it. His delegation looked to the future with a feeling of confidence and renewed commitment to the Treaty.

Ms. MASON (Canada) expressed her delegation's deep disappointment at the inability to reach consensus on a final declaration. None the less, during the weeks of detailed review consensus had been reached on virtually all issues, which would no doubt strengthen the Treaty. Canada would spare no

effort to ensure that that progress was built upon in the next five years leading to the crucial extension conference, for it firmly believed that the goal should and must be the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia) regretted that despite very hard work it had been impossible to reach agreement on a final declaration, in particular concerning a comprehensive test ban. More important, it was regrettable that in a new era of disarmament the commitments under legally binding multilateral instruments entered into over 25 years before were still pending. However, as other delegations had pointed out, important work had been accomplished and commitments reconfirmed at the Conference, and it could therefore be considered a success.

Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation deeply regretted that, despite constructive co-operation on the part of the non-aligned States parties to the Treaty, consensus had not been reached on a final declaration. His delegation had tried its best to narrow the gaps among the participants. Unfortunately, at the last minute a single nuclear-weapon State present had been unwilling to accept a proposal by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, although it had been accepted by the non-aligned countries and others participating in the consultations and consensus had been blocked.

While maintaining its commitment to the non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA full-scope safeguards, his country wished to record its dissatisfaction with the non-compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with the Treaty, in particular article VI. Meanwhile, the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular the developing and non-aligned countries, though fully committed to the Treaty, had not benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had not received preferential treatment with respect to non-parties. There was a need for serious consideration of those negative developments over the past two decades, in order that the extension of the Treaty should not be jeopardized.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) expressed regret that no final declaration had emerged from the Conference, despite the spirit of compromise that had prevailed in the discussions. It was in that spirit of compromise that his delegation had responded to the appeal by the Conference to supplier States to require the application of full-scope safeguards. In the absence of a final declaration, Belgian policy in future would depend on the attitude of the other supplier States.

It was sometimes forgotten that politics was the art of the possible, and that by focusing on a single aspect of the discussions, one delegation had assumed responsibility for what might be considered a failure. However, the work accomplished by the Conference showed that confidence in the Treaty and its effectiveness remained intact.

CLOSURE OF THE CONFERENCE

The PRESIDENT said that the lack of consensus on a final declaration should be seen as an incident rather than a disaster. After thanking all the delegations for their excellent work, he declared the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons closed.

The meeting rose at 5.30 a.m.